Research On Religion » imams

Richard Nielsen on Deadly Clerics

tonygill — Sun, 06 May 2018 08:00:54 +0000

Political rebellion and violence in the Middle East has recently been associated with religious belief and rhetoric, often spurred on by the writings and recordings of Muslim clerics. What motivates imams to advocate such tactics? Prof. Richard Nielsen, an associate professor of political science at the Massachusetts Institute of Technology, answers this question with reference to previous theories of revolution and an examination of the career paths of imams who advocate violent jihad. His findings reveal fascinating insights into what prompts individuals down the path of violence and suggests possible solutions to mitigating terrorism.

Our discussion begins with Rich recalling how he, himself, was led down an academic path of studying violent jihad. Initially on a STEM path, his experience watching the September 11 terrorist attacks unfold and a chance encounter with a professor at a Harry Potter film moved him in the direction of studying political science and international relations. He noted that most work on political violence in the Islamic world focuses on lay radicalization, so he turned his attention to what motivated various clerics to radicalize. Rich lays out the parameters of what constitutes an imam in Sunni Islam, pointing out that there is no central authority to determine membership in a priesthood exactly. We learn that “imam” means “to be in the front,” which opens up the definition of who speaks for Islam officially to a wide range of individuals. Rich observes that many people who are not formally trained in theology often present themselves as religious scholars (e.g., Osama bin Laden), sometimes employing the mundane tactic of posing in front of bookshelves to present an intellectual aura. We also discuss what a fatwa is, correcting some of the misperceptions that Westerners have. (Rich also reveals what the topic of the most downloaded fatwa is, and the answer may surprise you.)

Following this discussion, we move into a theoretical discussion of why men rebel. Rich covers the various existing explanations for why Muslims have joined militant movements in recent decades, including ideas that such behavior is inherent in the theology, that it is a response to modernity and secularizing pressure, and the rise of transnational philanthropy. Rich finds little credence in the theological uniqueness of Islam, though he does note that faith can motivate people to undertake actions that overcome pure self-interest. In contrast to these pre-existing theories, he advances a claim that builds upon the work of Ted Gurr who argued that rebel leaders are often prompted into their career paths when they face relative deprivation — expectations about where they should be in life do not match with their current circumstances. Prof. Nielsen then argues that many of the Muslim imams who have turned to advocating for political violence started out with academic ambitions that were frustrated by state action. He illustrates this with a few examples. Our conversation then turns to the use of social media in spreading jihadist thought, and whether or not Gurr’s theory of “relative deprivation” (or Nielsen’s notion of “blocked ambition”) is more noticeable now given that the costs of organizing collective action have decreased with telecommunications technology. Rich points out that sustaining collective action still requires organizational incentives, but it is now more possible for aggrieved individuals to get their message out, be it by Twitter or (a few decades ago) cassette tapes.

We finish the conversation with Prof. Nielsen’s reflections on how political violence can be combatted. He argues for less involvement of religion in politics, something he doesn’t see as a realistic option in Islamic nations in the near future. Another option, though, is to not block that intellectual pathways of budding scholars and clerics. We both note how this is very reflective of our own academic industry. Rich then finishes with some reflections about what he has learned over the course of his studies in the past two decades, noting how individuals often have post-hoc rationalizations for the actions they undertake, and how he started as a firm rational choice scholar devoted to statistical methodology, but developed an appreciation for social psychology and anthropological methods to research (without abandoning his former theoretical and methodological frameworks). Recorded: May 3, 2018.

(Note: At one point during the discussion, Tony accidently attributes “relative deprivation theory” to Charles Tilly and more institutional explanations to Ted Gurr, a mistake that should reveal that he wasn’t paying attention in graduate school.)

Ann Wainscott on Morocco’s Religious Foreign Policy

tonygill — Sun, 06 Sep 2015 08:00:00 +0000

During the past two years, the Moroccan government has begun exporting various religious education programs as part of its foreign policy strategy in the North and West African region. Prof. Ann Wainscott, an assistant professor of political science at St. Louis University, explains how this new development is both an outgrowth if its domestic religious strategy, and a response to requests by other nations to adopt some of the policies implemented in Morocco. We also receive a fascinating lesson in the unique brand of Moroccan and West African Islam, indicating that Islam is really a variegated religious tradition, not the monolithic entity that is often assumed by Westerners.

The conversation begins with Tony pointing out that Ann previously appeared on the show as a graduate student, but now is calling in as a tenure-track professor at a superb university. We chat a little bit about the transition from graduate student to professor, and Ann offers up a few pieces of wisdom for others who are about to go on the academic job market.

We quickly turn to a discussion of recent developments in Morocco and some of the fascinating changes that have taken place since Ann was on the show two years ago. Prof. Wainscott reviews the recent history of Morocco and briefly summarizes the government’s domestic policy towards religion over the past four decades or so. Dating back to the 1960s/70s, the Moroccan monarchy promoted Islamic education as a means of building a national identity that would counter growing secular leftist movements of the time. This policy inadvertently gave rise to some Islamic extremism, resulting in a major terrorist attack in Casablanca in 2003. Since that time, the regime of King Mohammed VI has become more involved in the religious education system as a means of moderating the more radical elements of Islam and as a means to avoid the bloody civil conflict that beset Algeria during the 1990s. Ann then notes that this domestic educational policy has been of great interest to several other countries in the North and West African region, and there have been requests by these nations to help implement similar policies leading to a new religious foreign policy emphasis.

Before diving into the specifics of Morocco’s religious foreign policy turn, Dr. Wainscott helps us understand the unique nature of Moroccan (and West African) Islam. She lists five features that make Islam in this region unique. The first feature, which is the dominance of Sunni Islam is not particularly unique to the region, but it is different than Shia Islam that has been increasingly promoted in the region by Iran, and which has concerned the Moroccan regime. The second differentiating aspect of Moroccan Islam is its general adherence to the Maliki school of legal interpretation, which is more flexible perspective than other legal traditions. Ann also explains why legal interpretation is important in Islam. Next, and in a related vein, Moroccan (and West African Islam) favors the Ash’ari doctrine of scriptural interpretation. This way of looking at the Koran and other holy texts promotes the use of human reasoning, and not just rote adherence to holy texts, as a means of understanding one’s faith. Moroccans also tend to favor Sufism, a mystical form of Islam that emphasizes ones direct experience with Allah. Fifth, and finally, Moroccans and others in the general West African region, prefer a Warsh style of scriptural recitation. Ann explains how this gives oral readings a distinct dialect and serves as an important signal that the Koranic texts being read come from an interpretation of Islam that favors the other four characteristics mentioned above.

We then return to a discussion of Morocco’s new foreign policy of promoting this brand or “flavor” of Islam in other countries in the region (as well as in France, which has a sizable Moroccan population). Interestingly, Ann points out that a desire to promote religious education as part of its foreign policy was not simply a unilateral decision by the Moroccan government, but rather developed out of requests by other nations to adopt Moroccan policy. Concerned by the emergence of a radical Islamist separatist movement in northern Mali, many political leaders in the region wanted a model for a more moderate and controlled Islam. Morocco’s experience proved tempting. Ann then argues that the success of Morocco in promoting its policies of religious education abroad are the result of three factors: 1) Morocco’s cultural and historical legitimacy in the region; 2) the pre-existing institutions that Morocco has built over the years; and 3) linking religious education with increased economic trade. Ann details several of the ongoing efforts to train regional religious scholars in Morocco, as well as to promote different scholarly associations abroad. Prof. Wainscott points out the strength of these initiatives by noting that King Mohammed VI has made several trips to other countries to promote these efforts and build new relationships. While seemingly innocuous to citizens in Western democracies, trips by monarchs or autocrats in less-than-democratic regimes often raise the probability of a coup, thus such trips by Mohammed VI are very notable. We finish with some of Ann’s reflections on these recent developments. While the promotion of more moderate forms of Islam may fall in favor with Western diplomats battling the “war on terror,” the increasing involvement by the government in training clergy is of concern in that it weakens a traditional buffer between the state and the citizenry. Recorded: September 1, 2015.